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REVERSING COURSE: A CRITIQUE OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS NEW RULES FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND 
CRIMINAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS 
Jay C. Carlisle II* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article will discuss recent developments by the Court of 
Appeals on the doctrine of unjust enrichment and on the 
elimination of non-pecuniary damages in criminal legal malpractice 
actions.  Specifically, the article will examine the cases of Georgia 
Malone & Co. v. Ralph Rieder1 and Dombrowski v. Bulson.2 
In Georgia Malone, a divided Court of Appeals held that a 
plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment claim could be dismissed as a matter of 
law at an early pleading stage.3  The five-judge majority adopted a 
heightened pleading requirement, which ignores almost one 
hundred years of established precedent4 and relies on unfounded 
policy justifications.5  The majority‘s opinion disregards the 
equitable concerns involved and creates a mandatory pleading rule 
requiring a connection between the plaintiff and the defendant.6  
The court‘s new rule is contrary to the remedy of unjust 
enrichment.7 
 
* Jay C. Carlisle II is one of the founding professors at Pace University School of Law.  He 
is a Commissioner for the New York State Law Revision Commission, an elected Life Fellow 
of the American Bar Foundation, and a Referee for the New York State Commission on 
Judicial Conduct. 
1 Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 973 N.E.2d 743, 950 N.Y.S.2d 333 
(2012). 
2 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 971 N.E.2d 338, 948 N.Y.S.2d 208 (2012). 
3 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 519, 973 N.E.2d at 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338. 
4 See infra Part II; see also Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 408, 113 N.E. 337, 339 (1916) 
(requiring pleading of essential facts); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 
2.20 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2012) (―[T]he plaintiff must plead merely that it would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit or that retention of the benefit without 
payment therefor [sic] would be unjust.‖ (first alteration in original) (citing and 
parenthetically quoting In re Whirlpool Corp., 684 F. Supp. 2d 942, 959 (N.D. Ohio 2009)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
5 See infra Part III.A. 
6 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 519, 973 N.E.2d at 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338. 
7 See infra Part III.A. 
1211 CARLISLE.EE.MLD 4/10/2013  9:32 AM 
1212 Albany Law Review [Vol. 76.2 
 
In Dombrowski, a unanimous Court of Appeals held a client could 
not seek damages for loss of liberty and emotional distress in a 
criminal legal malpractice action against his attorney.8  The 
Dombrowski opinion is based on a faulty analysis and unproven 
policy rationales.9  Also, the opinion is not in step with modern 
principles of law permitting recovery of non-pecuniary damages in 
such actions.10  Finally, a decision to immunize defense counsel from 
non-pecuniary damages in criminal legal malpractice actions should 
be made by the legislature and not by the Court of Appeals.11 
The Georgia Malone and Dombrowski decisions demonstrate the 
Court of Appeals‘ willingness to dismiss civil claims at the pleading 
stage for speculative policy justifications not included in the 
evidentiary record.12  These decisions are unfortunate departures 
from established case law and frustrate the letter and spirit of the 
 
8 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 352, 971 N.E.2d 338, 340, 948 N.Y.S.2d 208, 210 
(2012) (―We see no compelling reason to depart from the established rule limiting recovery in 
legal malpractice actions to pecuniary damages.‖). 
9 See discussion infra Part III.B.  Compare Dombrowski, 19 N.Y.3d at 352, 971 N.E.2d at 
340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210–11 (―Allowing this type of recovery would have, at best, negative 
and, at worst, devastating consequences for the criminal justice system.  Most significantly, 
such a ruling could have a chilling effect on the willingness of the already strapped defense 
bar to represent indigent accused.‖), with Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 
1987) (―Were we to accept the notion that a client‘s recovery on the grim facts of a case such 
as this must be limited to purely economic loss, we would be doubly wrong.  The negligent 
lawyer would receive the benefit of an enormous windfall, and the victimized client would be 
left without fair recourse in the face of ghastly wrongdoing.‖), and Rowell v. Holt, 850 So. 2d 
474, 480 (Fla. 2003) (―[W]e reject the respondent‘s arguments that permitting the assessment 
of damages for psychological injury in the instant case will open Pandora‘s Box to claims for 
emotional distress for ‗anyone who spent time in jail justifiably or not.‘‖). 
10 See Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451, 1464 (D.N.J. 1989) (―[A]n attorney who 
commits malpractice is liable for any reasonably foreseeable loss caused by his negligence 
including emotional distress resulting from the loss of liberty.‖ (quoting Wagenmann, 829 
F.2d at 222) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 458 
(Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1989) (―[R]ecovery of damages for emotional distress in a legal malpractice 
case—if it is to be limited at all—should turn on the nature of plaintiff‘s interest which is 
harmed and not merely on the reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct.‖). 
11 See Tracy A. Thomas, Restriction of Tort Remedies and the Constraints of Due Process: 
The Right to an Adequate Remedy, 39 AKRON L. REV. 975, 976 (2006) (―The pretextual use of 
jurisdiction to restrict remedies has serious implications both within and outside of the tort 
reform context.  The maneuver exceeds the purpose and intent of the legislative power to 
define and organize the judiciary.  Such a violation of the spirit of jurisdictional authority 
converts the legislature‘s power to define the jurisdiction of the courts into a plenary power to 
regulate, or eviscerate, all remedies and legal rights.‖).  Cf. Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi 
Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1633, 1636 (2004) (arguing that judicial denial of an adequate remedy violates due process); 
Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 
766 (2001) (arguing that Congress‘s restriction of remedies under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides inadequate redress which dilutes the individual‘s constitutional right). 
12 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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liberal pleading requirements in the CPLR.13 
II.  BACKGROUND—UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
―The essential inquiry in any action for unjust enrichment . . . is 
whether it is against equity and good conscience to permit the 
defendant to retain what is sought [by the plaintiffs] to be 
recovered.‖14  For almost one hundred years, since its holding in 
Miller v. Schloss,15 the Court of Appeals has asked if a benefit has 
been ―conferred on the defendant under mistake of fact or law, if the 
benefit still remains with the defendant . . . and whether the 
defendant‘s conduct was tortious or fraudulent.‖16  The court‘s focus 
has been on an equity and good conscience test,17 which, at the 
pleading stage, must be afforded a liberal construction with every 
favorable inference being given to the plaintiff.18 
 
13 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3026 (McKinney 2013) (―Pleadings shall be liberally construed.  
Defects shall be ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced.‖); Breytman v. 
Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 A.D.3d 703, 703–04, 864 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2008) 
(―[T]he court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the 
pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine 
only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.‖ (citing Leon v. 
Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 638 N.E.2d 511, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1994); Asgahar v. Tringali Realty, 
Inc., 18 A.D.3d 408, 408, 795 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2005) (citations omitted))); 
Foley v. D‘Agostino, 21 A.D.2d 60, 65, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 127 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 1964) 
(―[T]he burden [under CPLR section 3026] is expressly placed upon one who attacks a 
pleading for deficiencies in its allegations to show that he is prejudiced.‖); David D. Siegel, 
Taking Too Much for Granted About Liberalized Pleadings: “Skimpy” Pleading, Even Though 
Cause of Action May Exist, Brings Dismissal Too Late to Sue Over, 160 SIEGEL‘S PRAC. REV. 3 
(Apr. 2005) (―One of the CPLR‘s major accomplishments is its liberalization of pleadings: 
playing down technicalities and looking to the more basic question of whether, handsomely 
pleaded or not, the complaint gives notice of the transaction or occurrence out of which the 
claim arises, and, from anywhere within its four corners, covers the ‗material elements‘ of the 
claim pleaded.‖). 
14 Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 415, 421, 285 N.E.2d 695, 698, 334 
N.Y.S.2d 388, 393 (1972).   
To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, a party must show that: (1) the other party 
was enriched, (2) at that party‘s expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good 
conscience to permit the [other party] to retain what is sought to be recovered. 
Corsello v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 77 A.D.3d 344, 370, 908 N.Y.S.2d 57, 78 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 
2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Walker, 12 A.D.3d 480, 481, 787 
N.Y.S.2d 48, 48 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2008)) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
15 Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 407, 113 N.E. 337, 339 (1916). 
16 Paramount, 30 N.Y.2d at 421, 285 N.E.2d at 698, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 393 (citations 
omitted). 
17 Id.  
18 See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Leon, 84 N.Y.2d at 88, 638 N.E.2d at 
513, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 974 (―[T]he criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a 
cause of action, not whether he has stated one.‖ (quoting Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43, 
N.Y.2d, 268, 275, 372 N.E.2d 17, 20, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 185 (1977) (internal quotation marks 
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The Court of Appeals has long recognized there is a class of cases 
―where the law prescribes the rights and liabilities of persons who 
have not in reality entered into any contract at all with one 
another.‖19  These relationships are constructive contracts based on 
the equitable principle that one should not be allowed to enrich 
oneself unjustly at the expense of another, so an obligation is 
created by law in the absence of an agreement.20 
Thus in Bradkin v. Leverton,21 the Court of Appeals reversed the 
unjust enrichment dismissals of lower courts.22  Quoting Miller v. 
Schloss, Chief Judge Stanley Fuld stated: ―[a] quasi or constructive 
contract rests upon the equitable principle that a person shall not 
be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.‖23  
Chief Judge Fuld concluded that ―[a]lthough there was no 
agreement between them, express or implied, the defendant 
received a benefit from the plaintiff‘s services under circumstances 
which, in justice, preclude him from denying an obligation to pay for 
them.‖24  Chief Judge Fuld did not rely on or analyze the 
relationship between the parties in terms of a connection or 
awareness standard.25   
Similarly, in Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. State of New 
York,26 a divided court, speaking through Chief Judge Charles D. 
Breitel, reversed the lower court‘s finding of unjust enrichment 
because the defendant had not ―received any benefit, let alone 
unjust enrichment.‖27  Chief Judge Breitel did not rely on or analyze 
the relations between the parties in terms of a connection or 
 
omitted))); Roni LLC v. Arfa, 18 N.Y.3d 846, 848, 963 N.E.2d 123, 124, 939 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 
(2011) (―[W]e must give the complaint a liberal construction, accept the allegations as true 
and provide plaintiffs with the benefit of every favorable inference.‖). 
19 Schloss, 218 N.Y. at 407–08, 113 N.E. at 339. 
20 Id. at 407, 113 N.E. at 339 (―It is an obligation which the law creates, in the absence of 
any agreement, when and because the acts of the parties or others have placed in the 
possession of one person money, or its equivalent, under such circumstances that in equity 
and good conscience he ought not to retain it, and which ex æquo et bono belongs to another.  
Duty, and not a promise or agreement or intention of the person sought to be charged, defines 
it.  It is fictitiously deemed contractual, in order to fit the cause of action to the contractual 
remedy.‖). 
21 Bradkin v. Leverton, 26 N.Y.2d 192, 257 N.E.2d 643, 309 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1970). 
22 Id. at 197, 257 N.E.2d at 645, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 196. 




26 Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 415, 285 N.E.2d 695, 334 N.Y.S.2d 
338 (1972). 
27 Id. at 421, 285 N.E.2d at 698, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 393. 
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awareness standard.  Instead, he examined the record to determine 
if the defendant received a benefit and, if so, whether it was against 
equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what 
the plaintiff sought to recover.28 
In Simonds v. Simonds,29 a unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed 
the appellate division‘s imposition of a constructive trust on certain 
life insurance proceeds when a former spouse had breached a 
provision in a separation agreement.30  The court, speaking through 
Chief Judge Breitel, defined equitable notions of unjust enrichment 
as emerging from the rigidity of early common law and being based 
heavily on Roman law.31  Chief Judge Breitel explained, ―[e]quity 
arose to soften the impact of legal formalisms; to evolve formalisms 
narrowing the broad scope of equity is to defeat its essential 
purpose.‖32  He concluded that a constructive trust was necessary:  
The conclusion is an application of the general rule that 
equity regards as done that which should have been done.  
Thus, if an insured, upon lapse or cancellation of insurance, 
followed by replacement with new insurance, has a 
contractual obligation to designate a particular person as 
beneficiary, equity will consider the obligee as a 
beneficiary.33 
The Court of Appeals made it clear that the unjust enrichment 
doctrine does not require the performance of any wrongful act by 
the party enriched.  The court stated that ―[i]nnocent parties may 
frequently be unjustly enriched.  What is required, generally, is that 
a party hold property ‗under such circumstances that in equity and 
 
28 Id. (―It is difficult to say that the State has received any benefit, let alone unjust 
enrichment.‖). 
29 Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 380 N.E.2d 189, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1978). 
30 Id. at 242–43, 380 N.E.2d at 185, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (―The unjust enrichment in this 
case is manifest.  At a time when decedent was, certainly, anxious to remarry, he entered into 
a separation agreement with his wife of 14 years.  As part of the agreement, he promised to 
maintain $7,000 in life insurance with the first wife as beneficiary.  Later he broke his 
promise, and died with insurance policies naming only the second wife and daughter as 
beneficiaries.  They have collected the proceeds, amounting to more than $55,000, while the 
first wife has collected nothing.  Had the husband kept his promise, the beneficiaries would 
have collected $7,000 less in proceeds.  To that extent, the beneficiaries have been unjustly 
enriched, and the proceeds should be subjected to a constructive trust.‖). 
31 Id. at 238–39, 380 N.E.2d at 192, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 361–62 (―Born out of the extreme 
rigidity of the early common law, equity in its origins drew heavily on Roman law, where 
equitable notions had long been accepted.‖ (citations omitted)). 
32 Id. at 239, 380 N.E.2d at 192, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 362. 
33 Id. at 240, 380 N.E.2d at 193, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 362–63 (internal citations omitted). 
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good conscience he ought not to retain it.‘‖34  Chief Judge Breitel 
also stressed that courts, in their application of the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment, should not look to cases that ―rely heavily on 
formalisms and too little on basic equitable principles, long 
established in Anglo-American law and in this State.‖35  He 
concluded, quoting Chief Judge Benjamin Nathan Cardozo: ―[t]he 
equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief.‖36 
III.  RECENT DECISIONS 
In Goldman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,37 the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division and dismissed 
plaintiff‘s complaints.38  The Goldman (and Franco) plaintiffs had 
brought a putative class action for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment.39  The court noted that ―[l]ike the Goldman and Franco 
plaintiffs, Katz argues that the insurance contract was breached 
and that the defendant was unjustly enriched‖40 but concluded, 
―[h]ere, in each case, there was no unjust enrichment because the 
matter is controlled by contract.‖41  Thus, ―[g]iven that the disputed 
terms and conditions fall entirely within the insurance contract, 
there is no valid claim for unjust enrichment.‖42 
In Sperry v. Crompton Corp.,43 the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
appellate division‘s dismissal of plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment 
claim.44  The main issue before the court was whether treble 
damages relief was available to a class action plaintiff or barred by 
the application of CPLR section 901(b).45  The court, speaking 
though Judge Graffeo, held it was not, and then addressed the 
 
34 Id. at 242, 380 N.E.2d at 194, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (other citations omitted) (quoting 
Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 407, 113 N.E. 337, 339 (1916)). 
35 Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d at 243, 380 N.E.2d at 195, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 365 (referring to cases 
that decided the same issues differently). 
36 Id. (quoting Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 389, 122 N.E. 378, 
381 (1919)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
37 Goldman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 5 N.Y.3d 561, 841 N.E.2d 742, 807 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2005). 
38 Id. at 567, 841 N.E.2d at 743, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 584. 
39 Id. at 569, 841 N.E.2d at 744, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 585. 
40 Id. at 569, 841 N.E.2d at 745, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 586. 
41 Id. at 572, 841 N.E.2d at 746, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 587. 
42 Id. at 572, 841 N.E.2d at 746–47, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 587–88. 
43 Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 8 N.Y.3d 204, 863 N.E.2d 1012, 831 N.Y.S.2d 760.   
44 Id. at 209, 863 N.E.2d at 1013–14, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 761–62. 
45 Id. at 210, 863 N.E.2d at 1014, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 762 (rejecting a per se construction that 
―the Donnelly Act‘s treble damages provision is not a penalty under CPLR [section] 901(b),‖ 
as well as the claim that such damages are ―primarily remedial in nature‖). 
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secondary issue of whether the plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment class 
action claim was properly dismissed by the courts below.46 
The Court of Appeals stated, ―[t]he essential inquiry in any action 
for unjust enrichment or restitution is whether it is against equity 
and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain what is 
sought to be recovered.‖47  The court held ―that a plaintiff need not 
be in privity with the defendant to state a claim for unjust 
enrichment‖48 but concluded the ―claim does not lie under the 
circumstances of this case‖49 because ―the connection between the 
[parties] . . . is simply too attenuated to support such a claim.‖ 50  
The court did not explain, analyze or elaborate the meaning of ―too 
attenuated‖ which suggests the term is dicta, particularly when 
immediately followed by a reference to the primary issue before the 
court.  However, the court did state that ―in this situation it is not 
appropriate to substitute unjust enrichment to avoid the statutory 
limitations on the cause of action created by the Legislature.‖51  
Obviously the court‘s analysis of plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment class 
action claim was in the context of a class action.52   
The Sperry Court‘s unsupported reference to an attenuated 
―connection between the purchaser of tires and the producers of 
chemicals used in the rubber-making process‖ does not warrant a 
general finding that unjust enrichment claims require a pleading to 
allege a ―connection‖ between the parties.53  None of the pre-Sperry 
opinions, including supporting citations to Aristotle, Pomeroy, Chief 
Judges Benjamin Cardozo, Stanley Fuld, and Charles Brietel, 
explicitly or implicitly rely on a party ―connection‖ as a prerequisite 
to the maintenance of an unjust enrichment action.54  Their focus is 
 
46 Id. at 215–16, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766. 
47 Id. at 215, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766  (alteration in original) (quoting 
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y.2d 415, 421, 285 N.E.2d 695, 698, 344 
N.Y.S.2d 388, 393 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
48 Sperry, 8 N.Y.3d at 215, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 216, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 209 n.2, 863 N.E.2d at 1014 n.2, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 762 n.2 (―The lawsuit has not yet 
been certified as a class action under CPLR article 9.‖). 
53 Id. at 216, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766. 
54 See Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 239, 380 N.E.2d 189, 192, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359, 
362 (1978).  The court in Simonds stated: 
―Its great underlying principles, which are the constant sources, the never-failing roots, 
of its particular rules, are unquestionably principles of right, justice, and morality, so far 
as the same can become the elements of a positive human jurisprudence.‖  Law without 
principle is not law; law without justice is of limited value.  Since adherence to principles 
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on the equity and good conscience rule, which the Sperry court 
admits is ―[t]he essential inquiry in any action for unjust 
enrichment.‖55 
In IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.56 the Court of 
Appeals reversed the appellate division and held that plaintiff‘s 
unjust enrichment action failed to state a cause of action.57  The 
court, speaking though Judge Pigott, relied on its decision several 
years earlier in Goldman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., stating 
that ―‗[t]he theory of unjust enrichment lies as a quasi-contract 
claim.‘  It is an obligation imposed by equity to prevent injustice, in 
the absence of an actual agreement between the parties 
concerned.‖58  The court went on to conclude the plaintiff‘s action for 
unjust enrichment arose out of events subject to a written contract 
between the plaintiff and the defendant.59  The court explained the 
defendant was not required to return the ten million dollar fee to 
plaintiff because the ―fee arose from services governed‖ by a 
contract between the parties.60  The court also noted that plaintiff 
―did not pay the alleged fees.‖61 
In Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein,62 a unanimous Court of 
Appeals affirmed a divided appellate division‘s decision to uphold 
the dismissal of plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment claim by the supreme 
court.63  The dispute arose over the purchase and sale of the 
painting ―Paysage aux Trois Arbres‖ by Paul Gauguin.64  Plaintiff 
 
of ―law‖ does not invariably produce justice, equity is necessary.  
Id. (other citations omitted) (quoting 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 67 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (1881)) (citing ARISTOTLE, 
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 9, at 1019–20 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941)). 
55 Sperry, 8 N.Y.3d at 215, 863 N.E.2d at 1018, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 766 (quoting Paramount, 
30 N.Y.2d at 421, 285 N.E.2d at 698, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 393). 
56 IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132, 907 N.E.2d 268, 879 
N.Y.S.2d 355 (2009). 
57 Id. at 138, 879 N.E.2d at 271, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 358. 
58 Id. at 142, 907 N.E.2d at 274, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (quoting Goldman v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., 5 N.Y.3d 561, 572, 841 N.E.2d 742, 746, 807 N.Y.S.2d 583, 587 (2005)). 
59 IDT Corp., 12 N.Y.3d at 142, 907 N.E.2d at 274, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 361 (―It follows that the 
unjust enrichment claim cannot form the basis of IDT‘s demand that Morgan Stanley return 
the $10,000,000 fee paid in relation to the Net2Phone, Inc. transaction, because that fee arose 




62 Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16 N.Y.3d 173, 944 N.E.2d 1104, 919 N.Y.S.2d 
465 (2011). 
63 Id. at 183, 944 N.E.2d at 1111, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 472. 
64 Id. at 176, 944 N.E.2d at 1106, 919 N.Y.S. at 467. 
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had purchased the painting based on an appraisal from the 
defendant who concealed his ownership interest in the painting.65  
As a result, plaintiff claimed defendant was unjustly enriched.66 
The court, speaking through Judge Jones, adopted the traditional 
equity and good conscience test for unjust enrichment cases in New 
York.67  The court stated, ―[a] plaintiff must show that (1) the other 
party was enriched, (2) at that party‘s expense, and (3) that it is 
against equity and good conscience to permit [the other party] to 
retain what is sought to be recovered.‖68  The court then curiously 
adopted the ―too attenuated connection‖ dicta language from its 
earlier Sperry class action dismissal as a policy justification to 
dismiss Mandarin‘s unjust enrichment claim, stating that ―there are 
no indicia of an enrichment that was unjust where the pleadings 
failed to indicate a relationship between the parties that could have 
caused reliance or inducement.‖69  The court considered the absence 
of a pleading ―connection‖ between the plaintiff and defendant to be 
crucial because, ―[w]ithout sufficient facts, conclusory allegations 
that fail to establish that a defendant was unjustly enriched at the 
expense of a plaintiff warrant dismissal.‖70  The court reaffirmed 
the New York rule that privity is not required for an unjust 
enrichment claim but then in a strange twist qualified the no 
privity rule by stating: ―a claim will not be supported if the 
connection between the parties is too attenuated.‖71   
The court did not explain why its new broad pleading specificity 
rule was necessary for unjust enrichment actions or how it could 
possibly supersede the centuries old equitable doctrine created on 
basic principles of good conscience and fairness.72  The court 
provided no guidance or precedent as to what constitutes ―too 
attenuated [a] connection‖ between parties in an unjust enrichment 
adversarial proceeding.73  The court failed to provide any policy 
justification for its new formalistic pleading rule other than those 
 
65 Id. at 176–77, 944 N.E.2d at 1106–07, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 467–68. 
66 Id. at 176, 944 N.E.2d at 1106, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 467. 
67 Id. at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1110, 919 N.Y.S. at 471.  
68 Id. (quoting Citibank N.A. v. Walker, 12 A.D.3d 480, 481, 787 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (App. Div. 
2d Dep‘t 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
69 Mandarin, 16 N.Y.3d at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1111, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 472. 
70 Id. at 183, 944 N.E.2d at 1111, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (citations omitted). 
71 Id. at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1111, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (citing Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 8 
N.Y.3d 204, 863 N.E.2d 1012, 831 N.Y.S.2d 760 (2007)). 
72 Mandarin, 16 N.Y.3d at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1110–11, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 471–72. 
73 Id. at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1111, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 472. 
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that were fact specific to its Mandarin holding.74  Thus the 
Mandarin Court‘s qualification of the no privity rule is clearly dicta, 
and should not be binding in subsequent decisions.75 
A.  Georgia Malone 
1.  Background 
Plaintiff Georgia Malone & Co., a real estate and consulting firm, 
provided its clients with information regarding the purchase and 
sale of properties.76  Defendant Rosewood Realty engaged in the real 
estate business.77  Georgia Malone prepared due diligence reports 
for a developer (CenterRock) and its managing member, defendant 
Ralph Rieder, who agreed to keep them confidential and to pay 
Malone a 1.25% commission of the total purchase price for its 
brokerage work.78  Based on Malone‘s reports, CenterRock executed 
a contract of sale to purchase properties for $70 million, which it 
later terminated.79  CenterRock ―refused to pay Malone‘s demand 
for its commission in the amount of $875,000 (1.25% of the contract 
price).‖80 
Malone claimed that it gave the due diligence materials to a third 
party for the purpose of selling them to Rosewood, after CenterRock 
terminated the deal.81  Malone then alleged that Rosewood used her 
materials to generate a commission of $500,000 from a subsequent 
sale of real property.82 
Malone commenced an action for breach of contract against 
CenterRock and Ralph Rieder, and asserted unjust enrichment 
 
74 Id.  
75 Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 86 A.D.3d 406, 409–10, 926 N.Y.S.2d 494, 498 (App. 
Div. 1st Dep‘t 2011), aff’d, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 973 N.E.2d 743, 950 N.Y.S.2d 333 (2012); see also 
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 480–81, 467 N.E.2d 245, 248–49, 478 
N.Y.S.2d 597, 600–01 (1984) (citations omitted) (concluding that the existence of an alternate 
forum is not a prerequisite to the application of forum non conveniens as such a requirement 
had its origin in dicta by the United States Supreme Court and was not binding to future 
decisions, although the dictum has persisted as the general rule and has been quoted in 
subsequent cases). 
76 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 513, 973 N.E.2d at 744, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 334. 
77 Id. at 514, 973 N.E.2d at 744, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 334. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 514–15, 973 N.E.2d at 745, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 335. 
80 Id. at 515, 973 N.E.2d at 745, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 335. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
1211 CARLISLE.EE.MLD 4/10/2013  9:32 AM 
2012/2013] Developments in Unjust Enrichment 1221 
 
claims against CenterRock, Rieder, and Rosewood.83  The ―Supreme 
Court dismissed all claims except those against CenterRock.  On 
Malone‘s appeal, the Appellate Division modified, with two Justices 
dissenting, by reinstating the unjust enrichment claims against the 
Rieders, and otherwise affirmed.‖84 
Malone then appealed to the Court of Appeals, seeking 
reinstatement of its unjust enrichment claim on the grounds that 
Rosewood profited, at Malone‘s expense, by collecting a commission 
on the sale of the properties.85  Rosewood argued Malone failed to 
state an unjust enrichment claim because it did not allege a 
―business relationship or connection between them.‖86  Rosewood 
also argued that Malone‘s complaint was inadequate because it did 
not assert that Rosewood was aware of the confidentiality of the 
Malone due diligence report, or that Rosewood knew that 
CenterRock had not paid Malone for producing the due diligence 
documents.87  These defenses were based on the Mandarin and 
Sperry heightened pleading requirements.88 
2.  The Court of Appeals‘ Decision 
The Court of Appeals majority defined the question as follows: 
In this action, a real estate company that prepared due 
diligence reports for a developer in connection with the 
potential purchase of commercial properties alleges that a 
rival brokerage firm was unjustly enriched when it acquired 
the materials from the developer and later obtained a 
commission on the ultimate sale of the properties.  The issue 
before us is whether a sufficient relationship existed between 
the two real estate firms to provide a basis for an unjust 
enrichment cause of action.  Based on the allegations 
presented in the complaint, we hold that the relationship 
between these two parties was too attenuated.89  
 
83 Id. 
84 Id. (citing Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 86 A.D.3d 406, 409–10, 926 N.Y.S.2d 494, 
498 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2011), aff’d, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 973 N.E.2d 743, 950 N.Y.S.2d 333 
(2012)). 
85 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 515, 973 N.E.2d at 745, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 335. 
86 Id. at 515–16, 973 N.E.2d at 745–46, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 335–36. 
87 Id. at 516, 973 N.E.2d at 746, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 336. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 513, 973 N.E.2d at 744, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 334. 
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a.  The Majority  
The majority based its decision to deny Malone‘s request for 
reinstatement of its unjust enrichment claim against Rosewood on 
the following factors.  First, Malone failed to plead a claim for 
unjust enrichment due to a lack of factual allegations in its 
complaint that indicated a relationship (business relationship or 
connection) between Malone and Rosewood, ―or at least an 
awareness by [the defendant] of [the plaintiff‘s] existence.‖90  The 
court relied on its earlier, fact-specific, heightened pleading rules in 
Sperry v. Crompton Corp. and Mandarin Trading Limited v. 
Wildenstein.91  Second, if Malone‘s unjust enrichment claim was 
permitted, it ―would impose a burdensome obligation in commercial 
transactions.‖92 
The majority‘s policy justification for dismissal of Malone‘s unjust 
enrichment claim is less than one paragraph and not supported by 
the record.93  The majority stated, ―[t]he rule urged by Malone 
would require parties to probe the underlying relationships between 
the businesses with whom they contract and other entities 
tangentially involved but with whom they have no direct 
connection.‖94 
b.  The Dissent 
Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Pigott, citing Mandarin Trading 
Ltd. v. Wildenstein, stated: 
We have established that ―[t]he essential inquiry in any 
action for unjust enrichment . . . is whether it is against 
equity and good conscience to permit the defendant to retain 
what is sought to be recovered.‖  It is apparent that equity 
and good conscience do not permit Rosewood to retain the 
benefits of Malone‘s diligent work, and that plaintiff has 
 
90 Id. at 517, 973 N.E.2d at 746, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Mandarin Trading Ltd., 16 N.Y.3d at 182, 944 N.E.2d at 1110, 919 N.Y.S.2d at 471 (2011)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
91 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 517–18, 973 N.E.2d at 746–47, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 336–37 
(―Similar to Sperry and Mandarin, the relationship between Malone and Rosewood is too 
attenuated because they simply had no dealings with each other.‖). 
92 Id. at 519, 973 N.E.2d at 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338. 
93 See id. 
94 Id. 
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adequately pleaded that Rosewood was unjustly enriched.95 
The dissent stressed that the plaintiff‘s pleadings showed that 
―Malone performed the services and due diligence necessary to 
equip a buyer to negotiate and to execute the purchase of the 
commercial properties.  Rosewood then profited. . . . while Malone 
never received compensation for its work.‖96  The dissent explained 
that ―it is only fair to allow Malone‘s claim against Rosewood to 
proceed at this early stage in the litigation.‖97 
The dissent explained that the court‘s precedent on unjust 
enrichment never required there be a business relationship or 
connection between the parties.98  Citing Chief Judge Fuld,99 the 
dissent stated, ―In Bradkin v. Leverton, we found a viable unjust 
enrichment claim where there were no direct dealings between 
plaintiff and defendant. . . . The defendant in Bradkin knowingly 
used plaintiff‘s contacts without paying for them, similar to 
Rosewood‘s alleged use of Malone‘s due diligence materials.‖100  The 
dissent, citing Simonds v. Simonds, also stated: 
This Court‘s precedent on unjust enrichment has never 
required that there be a close relationship or dealings 
between the parties. . . . ―What is required, generally, is that 
a party hold property ‗under such circumstances that in 
equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it. . . . ‘‖  
Nowhere in Simonds did we require defendant to have 
procured the unjust benefit or that there be contact between 
plaintiff and defendant.101  
Also, the dissent distinguished Sperry v. Crompton Corp. and 
Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, stating, ―[o]ur holdings in 
Sperry and Mandarin Trading never required that there be direct 
contact or a close relationship between the parties.‖102 
 
95 Id. (Lippman, C.J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (other citation omitted) (quoting 
Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16 N.Y.3d 173, 182, 944 N.E.2d 1104, 1110, 919 
N.Y.S.2d 465, 471 (2011)). 
96 Id. at 520, 973 N.E.2d at 748–49, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338–39. 
97 Id. at 520, 973 N.E.2d at 749, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 339. 
98 Id. at 521, 973 N.E.2d at 749, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 339 (―Requiring a relationship of mutual 
dealing where the plaintiff confers a benefit on the unjustly enriched party treads too close to 
requiring privity, which this Court expressly disclaimed in Sperry and Mandarin Trading.‖). 
99 Bradkin v. Leverton, 26 N.Y.2d 192, 257 N.E.2d 643, 309 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1970). 
100 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 523, 973 N.E.2d at 751, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (Lippman, 
C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
101 Id. at 522, 973 N.E.2d at 750, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 340 (quoting Simonds v. Simonds, 45 
N.Y.2d 233, 242, 380 N.E.2d 189, 194, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (1978)). 
102 Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 521, 973 N.E.2d at 749, 950 N.Y.S. at 339.   
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Finally the dissent rejected the majority‘s policy justifications for 
dismissing Malone‘s unjust enrichment claim against Rosewood.103  
Chief Judge Lippman explained a ruling in favor of Malone ―would 
not impede commercial transactions or create an excessive burden 
on contracting parties.‖104  He stated, ―[i]f a business partner 
conveys information whose source is clearly the company‘s direct 
competitor, the company can inquire about the circumstances of the 
transmission of the information.‖105  If Rosewood saw Malone‘s 
name on the due diligence materials, an allegation that could be 
fully shown during discovery, it is highly likely for Rosewood to 
have known the materials were suspect.106  Thus, Chief Judge 
Lippman concluded that Malone‘s complaint should not have been 
dismissed at the pleading stage.107 
3. Critique 
It is well established in New York that under CPLR section 3211, 
a motion to dismiss should not be granted without first affording 
the plaintiffs pleading a liberal construction, and according it the 
benefit of every possible favorable inference.108 
Unjust enrichment claims are subject to modern pleading rules in 
New York, and to CPLR section 104, which requires application of a 
just determination standard.109  Malone‘s complaint should not have 
 




106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See Roni LLC. v. Arfa, 18 N.Y.3d 846, 848, 963 N.E.2d 123, 124, 939 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 
(2011) (―On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, however, we must give the complaint a liberal 
construction, accept the allegations as true and provide plaintiffs with the benefit of every 
favorable inference.  Indeed, the question of ‗[w]hether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its 
allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss.‘‖ (quoting EBC I, 
Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 N.Y.3d 11, 19, 832 N.E.2d 26, 31, 799 N.Y.S.2d 170, 175 
(2005)); see also Jacobs v. Macy‘s E., Inc., 262 A.D.2d 607, 608, 693 N.Y.S.2d 164, 167 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep‘t 1999) (―It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to 
state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, 
accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiff the 
benefit of every possible favorable inference.‖ (citations omitted)); Gruen v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 
187 A.D.2d 560, 562, 590 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 1992) (―[T]he sole criterion is 
whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations 
are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion . . 
. will fail.‖ (alteration in original) (quoting Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275, 
372 N.E.2d 17, 20, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 185 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
109 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 104 (McKinney 
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been dismissed without giving her at least limited disclosure to 
establish the existence of genuine issues of material fact between 
the parties.  If she failed to do so, her complaint could be dismissed 
by a summary judgment.   
The majorities adoption of a ―sufficient relationship‖ pleading rule 
as a mandatory requirement for maintenance of unjust enrichment 
actions in New York is unfounded and contrary to the equity and 
good conscience test established by almost one hundred years of 
jurisprudence in the Empire State.110  The majorities new pleading 
rule is nothing more than a heightened pleading requirement based 
on questionable dicta from its Sperry and Mandarin Trading 
decisions, and, unfortunately, contravenes pleading requirements 
mandated by the CPLR and applicable case law.111 
The majority‘s focus on a connection between the parties may be 
applicable to unjust enrichment claims based on a ―quantum meruit 
theory‖ where it makes sense to require some connection between 
the parties that is not ―too attenuated.‖112  However, the majority 
fails to recognize that an unjust enrichment claim is broader than a 
quantum meruit claim.  As Chief Judges Breitel and Fuld explained 
there is no need for a ―connection‖ because the equity and good 
conscience test asks only if a benefit has been conferred on the 
defendant under mistake of fact or law.113  If the benefit remains 
with the defendant, the court may determine if the defendant‘s 
 
2013). 
110 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 4.1(2) (2d ed. 
1993) (―Unjust enrichment cannot be precisely defined, and for that very reason has potential 
for resolving new problems in striking ways.‖); 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION  § 
1.3 (1978) (―The great development of constructive trust as a remedy aimed at unjust 
enrichment has taken place in this country [the United States], for most of our courts have 
freed the remedy of any necessary connection with fiduciary relationship.‖); id. § 1.1 (―Unjust 
enrichment is an indefinable idea in the same way that justice is indefinable.  But many of 
the meanings of justice are derived from a sense of injustice.‖). 
111 See Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 86 A.D.3d 406, 418–19, 926 N.Y.S.2d 494, 505–06 
(App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2011) (Acosta, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority‘s attempt to 
reintroduce a heightened privity requirement for prudential reasons), aff’d, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 
973 N.E.2d 743, 950 N.Y.S.2d 333 (2012). 
112 Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 522 n.2, 973 N.E.2d 743, 750 n.2, 950 
N.Y.S.2d 333, 340 n.2 (2012) (―Only plaintiffs pleading a quantum meruit theory of unjust 
enrichment are required to show that they performed services for the defendants or at the 
defendant‘s behest.‖ (citations omitted)); id. at 516, 973 N.E.2d at 746, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 336. 
113 Id. at 522, 973 N.E.2d at 750, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 340 (―What is required, generally, is that 
a party hold property under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought 
not to retain it.‖ (citations omitted) (quoting Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 407, 113 N.E. 
337, 339 (1916)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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conduct has been tortious or fraudulent.114  The fact that a 
―relationship‖ must exist between the plaintiff and defendant will 
often frustrate the purpose of unjust enrichment actions.115 
For example, assume a New York employee embezzles one million 
dollars from her employer and gives the money to her uncle in 
Buffalo who has no ―relationship‖ or ―connection‖ with the 
employer.  Under Georgia Malone, the employer might be unable to 
maintain an action against the uncle unless he was ―aware‖ the gift 
was stolen from the employer.116  If the employer‘s action was 
dismissed at an early pleading stage, it would have no opportunity 
to develop facts through discovery to support an unjust enrichment 
argument.117  Georgia Malone explicitly requires the employer to 
plead with specificity and particularity facts that unequivocally 
demonstrate what the Court of Appeals defines as a ―substantial 
relationship‖ prerequisite.118  The principle goes further.  Suppose 
Rembrandt (―R‖), removes Paul Gauguins ―Paysage Aux Trois 
Arbes‖ from the Metropolitan Museum and sells it to Picasso (―P‖) 
for one million dollars  (assume the painting is worth fifteen million 
dollars and P, who lives in rural Wyoming County, has no 
relationship with the Met or reason to believe the painting is worth 
more than one million dollars).  Assuming P is a purchaser in good 
faith, can the Met sue him and recover damages under an unjust 
enrichment theory?  What would Chief Judges Breitel and Fuld 
say?  These hypotheticals and other questions, such as privity 
concerns, cut against the majority‘s Georgia Malone rule. 
 
114  Schloss, 218 N.Y. at 407–08, 113 N.E. at 339 (―There is a class of cases where the law 
prescribes the rights and liabilities of persons who have not in reality entered into any 
contract at all with one another, but between whom circumstances have arisen which make it 
just that one should have a right, and the other should be subject to a liability . . . .‖ (quoting 
People ex rel. Dusenbury v. Speir, 77 N.Y. 144, 150 (1879)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
115 As a result of Georgia Malone, a claim for unjust enrichment requires a showing of a 
direct relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; that the defendant was enriched 
at the plaintiff‘s expense; and that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the other 
party to retain the benefits.  Georgia Malone, 19 N.Y.3d at 516–17, 973 N.E.2d at 746–47, 950 
N.Y.S.2d at 336–37. 
116 See id. at 519, 973 N.E.2d at 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (dismissing unjust enrichment 
claim because it failed to allege that the third-party was aware of the wrongfulness of the 
actions perpetrated against the plaintiff). 
117 See id. at 520, 973 N.E.2d at 749, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 339 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting) 
(stating that under CPLR section 3211, motions to dismiss are to be given liberal 
constructions and provide the opposing party the benefit of all possible favorable inferences). 
118 Id. at 519, 973 N.E.2d at 748, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (majority opinion) (holding that a 
sufficient showing of a connection between the parties at the pleading stage is necessary 
under a unjust enrichment claim). 
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In addition, there are serious concerns about the Georgia 
Malone‘s majority policy justification.119  The dissent addresses 
them,120 but in addition, it is common knowledge that information 
or real estate is available through engineering reports, financial 
reports and other documents, but it is necessary for a professional 
broker to marshal and analyze the data.121  Doesn‘t a broker, such 
as Georgia Malone, deserve to be compensated?  The Court of 
Appeals‘ majority policy justification has ―set back the rules of real 
estate building sales for generations by allowing a competing broker 
who purchased stolen due diligence information to profit greatly 
while the procuring broker received nothing.‖122 
Finally, the majority‘s policy justifications are not supported by 
the record because Georgia Malone‘s unjust enrichment claim 
against Rosewood was dismissed at an early pleading stage.123  New 
York courts never had an opportunity to consider the merits or 
whether equity and good conscience entitled Georgia Malone to 
recover damages from Rosewood!  The final result is unfair and 
provides confusing precedent for plaintiffs filing unjust enrichment 
claims in New York. 
 
119 Id. (stating that a rule requiring parties to examine both the businesses with whom 
they contract and other businesses who are involved, yet have no direct connection with the 
specific party, would create a burdensome requirement within commercial transactions). 
120 Id. at 523, 973 N.E.2d at 751, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the majority‘s concerns are unfounded, and that finding for unjust enrichment  in the 
case at hand would not impeded commercial transactions). 
121 Id. at 522, 973 N.E.2d at 750–51, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 340–41 (―Drawing every inference in 
favor of plaintiff, Rosewood could not have been a good-faith purchaser because it had notice 
from Malone‘s letterhead that the diligence materials did not belong to CenterRock and the 
Rieders.‖). 
122 See John Caher, Nexus Needed for Unjust Enrichment Is Clarified, N.Y.L.J., June 29, 
2012; Glen Banks, Addressing Unjust Enrichment Claim at Pleading Stage, N.Y.L.J., July 23, 
2012. 
123 Generally, a party responding to a motion under CPLR section 3211(a) or CPLR section 
3211(b) may demonstrate that facts may exist that would justify the case proceeding forward 
but that those facts cannot be stated at that time, as necessary disclosure has not yet 
occurred.  See generally David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, C3211:49–51, in N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 3211 (McKinney 2013) (observing that CPLR section 3211(d) affords the court 
discretion to deny or permit further affidavits or allow discovery prior to dismissal); N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 3041 (McKinney 2013) (―Any party may require any other party to give a bill of 
particulars of such party‘s claim, or a copy of the items of the account alleged in a pleading.‖); 
Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 62, 70–71, 790 N.E.2d 1156, 1162, 760 
N.Y.S.2d 727, 733 (2003) (―[I]n default proceedings [where] the defendant has failed to appear 
and the plaintiff does not have the benefit of discovery, the affidavit or verified complaint need 
only allege enough facts to enable a court to determine that a viable cause of action exists.‖ 
(quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Harold L. Korn & Arthur R. Miller, New York Civil Practice: 
CPLR PP 3215:24 (7th ed. 2012) (emphasis added))). 
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B.  Dombrowski v. Bulson—The New Rule Eliminating Recovery of 
Non-Pecuniary Damages in Criminal Legal Malpractice Actions 
In Dombrowski v. Bulson, a unanimous Court of Appeals held 
that a plaintiff suing his former defense attorney in a criminal legal 
malpractice action could not recover non-pecuniary damages for loss 
of liberty and emotional distress.124  The court reversed the 
appellate division which had found a parallel between actions for 
malpractice in criminal claims and claims for false arrest and 
malicious prosecution.125  The Court of Appeals rejected this 
conclusion and relied on unsubstantiated policy reasons to support 
its decision.126  The court, speaking through Chief Judge Lippman, 
stated: 
Allowing this type of recovery would have, at best, negative 
and, at worst, devastating consequences for the criminal 
justice system.  Most significantly, such a ruling could have a 
chilling effect on the willingness of the already strapped 
defense bar to represent indigent accused.  Further, it would 
put attorneys in the position of having an incentive not to 
participate in post-conviction efforts to overturn wrongful 
convictions.127 
The Dombrowski decision is based on faulty analysis and 
unproven policy justifications.  The opinion is contrary to modern 
principles of law encouraging recovery of non-pecuniary damages in 
such actions.128  Furthermore, the court‘s policy rational should be 
left to the legislature, which is in a better position to determine if 
the lawyers should be immune from non-pecuniary damage awards 
for criminal malpractice actions. 
1.  Background  
In Wilson v. City of New York,129 a client bought an action against 
 
124 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 352, 971 N.E.2d 338, 340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d 208, 
210–11 (2012). 
125 Id. at 351, 971 N.E.2d at 340, 948 N.E.2d at 210 (―Although the harm suffered by the 
claimant is the same—loss of liberty—we reject the argument that these types of actions are 
analogous.‖). 
126 Id. at 352, 971 N.E.2d at 340–41, 948 N.E.2d at 210–11. 
127 Id. 
128 See infra Part III.B.2. 
129 Wilson v. City of N.Y., 294 A.D.2d 290, 743 N.Y.S.2d 30 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2002).  The 
court held that a criminal defendant ―must demonstrate that he would have been either 
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his former attorney for legal malpractice in a criminal matter.130  
The supreme court denied the attorney‘s motion for summary 
judgment, and the appellate division, in an issue of first impression, 
reversed,131 relying on Wolkstein v. Morgenstern,132 which held ―[a] 
cause of action for legal malpractice does not afford recovery for any 
item of damages other than pecuniary loss.‖133  The appellate 
division explained that ―pecuniary damages ‗compensate [a] victim 
for the economic consequences of the injury, such as medical 
expenses [and] lost earnings‘ while . . . nonpecuniary damages [are] 
‗those damages awarded to compensate an injured person for the 
physical and emotional consequences of the injury.‘‖134  The 
appellate division admitted the primary harm caused by the 
attorney malpractice is an unwarranted loss of liberty which is 
necessarily non-pecuniary in nature but stated, ―[t]his Court‘s 
holding in Wolkstein v. Morgenstern . . . amounts to a policy-based 
ruling not limited to that context.‖135  The appellate division did not 
explain or justify its ―policy-based‖ ruling in Wolkstein, but merely 
concluded ―that the non-pecuniary damages must be dismissed is as 
applicable in the instant matter as it was in Wolkstein.‖136 
In Dombrowski v. Bulson, the plaintiff alleged that his attorney 
negligently represented him in a criminal action and that, as a 
result, he was convicted after a jury trial of two felonies and a 
misdemeanor.137  Plaintiff was sentenced to four years plus a period 
of post-release supervision.138  The county court denied plaintiff‘s 
motion to vacate the judgment of conviction on the ground of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and the plaintiff sought and 
obtained a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.139  The 
federal magistrate determined that plaintiff‘s defense counsel failed 
 
exonerated or released earlier, and therefore not subjected to attack by a fellow inmate, had 
[counsel] not represented him in a negligent manner.‖  Id. at 293, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 33. 
130 Id. at 291, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 31. 
131 Id. at 292–93, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 32 (―[L]imiting victims of legal malpractice to pecuniary 
damages, although issued in the context of a claim of legal malpractice in a civil action, 
amounts to a policy-based ruling not limited to that context.‖). 
132 Wolkstein v. Morgenstern, 275 A.D.2d 635, 743 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2000) 
133 Id. at 637, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 173. 
134 Wilson, 294 A.D.2d at 292, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 32 (quoting McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 
246, 251, 536 N.E.2d 372, 373, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (1989)). 
135 Wilson, 294 A.D.2d at 292–93, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 32. 
136 Id. at 293, 743 N.Y.S.2d at 33. 
137 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 349, 971 N.E.2d 338, 339, 948 N.E.2d 208, 209 
(2012). 
138 Id. at 350, 971 N.E.2d at 339, 948 N.E.2d at 209. 
139 Id. at 349, 971 N.E.2d at 339, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 209. 
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to conduct an adequate investigation and failed to conduct a 
sufficient cross examination of the complainant.140  When the 
magistrate issued his ruling, plaintiff had been imprisoned for more 
than five years and the prosecution declined to retry him.141  The 
indictment was dismissed and plaintiff sued his former attorney for 
legal malpractice seeking money damages for his loss of liberty 
arising from his wrongful imprisonment and for lost wages.142 
The supreme court granted defendant‘s summary judgment 
motion holding plaintiff had no right to recover any damages.143  
The appellate division affirmed the lower courts order that plaintiff 
could not recover pecuniary damages for lost wages since he had 
received disability payments while incarcerated but concluded that 
the lower court had erred in determining that plaintiff was not 
entitled to seek non-pecuniary damages for his loss of liberty and 
emotional distress.144 
The appellate division stated, ―[i]t is well settled that 
nonpecuniary damages are not recoverable in a legal malpractice 
action involving the negligence of an attorney in a civil matter,‖145 
but, citing Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical 
Center,146 noted: ―[w]here emotional or other nonpecuniary loss is a 
direct result of a defendant‘s breach of duty, a plaintiff may recover 
damages for such loss.‖147  The appellate division analogized a cause 
of action for criminal legal malpractice to actions for false arrest 
and malicious prosecution both of which allow for plaintiffs to 
recover damages for loss of liberty resulting from her wrongful 
imprisonment.148 
The appellate division also noted recent trends in other 
jurisdictions allowing recovery of non-pecuniary damages in 
 
140 Id. at 349–50, 971 N.E.2d at 339, 948 N.E.2d at 209. 




145 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 79 A.D.3d 1587, 1589, 915 N.Y.S.2d 778, 780 (App. Div. 4th 
Dep‘t 2010), rev’d, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 971 N.E.2d 338, 948 N.E.2d 208 (2012). 
146 Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d 538, 518 
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987). 
147 Dombrowski, 79 A.D.3d at 1589, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 780. 
148 Id. at 1589–90, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (―In our view, a cause of action for criminal legal 
malpractice is analogous to causes of action for false arrest and malicious prosecution, both of 
which allow recovery for the plaintiff‘s loss of liberty resulting from the plaintiff‘s wrongful 
incarceration.‖). 
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criminal legal malpractice cases,149 and concluded that a plaintiff 
wrongfully convicted due to the malpractice of his attorney in a 
criminal case may recover loss of liberty or other losses directly 
attributable to his imprisonment.150 
2.  The Court of Appeals‘ Decision  
A unanimous Court of Appeals found the First Department‘s 
unexplained first impression policy rationale in Wilson v. City of 
New York preferable to the thoughtful and enlightened Dombrowski 
opinion by the Fourth Department.151  Chief Judge Lippman stated, 
―[w]e see no compelling reason to depart from the established rule 
limiting recovery in legal malpractice actions to pecuniary 
damages.‖152  The court reversed the appellate division‘s 
modification and reinstatement of that portion of the plaintiff‘s 
complaint seeking non-pecuniary damages and held, as a matter of 
law, that these damages are not permitted in legal malpractice 
actions arising out of criminal representation.153  The court 
reasoned that criminal attorney malpractice requires the plaintiff to 
have ―at least a colorable claim of actual innocence—that the 
conviction would not have resulted absent the attorney‘s negligent 
representation.‖154 
The Court of Appeals rejected the appellate division‘s finding that 
there is a parallel between actions for malpractice in criminal 
actions and claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution.155  The 
court observed, ―[f]alse arrest and malicious prosecution are 
intentional torts.  Malicious prosecution, in particular, requires a 
showing that the proceeding was commenced against the claimant 
with actual malice.‖156  The court‘s distinction between intentional 
 
149 Id. at 1590, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (citing Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 221–22 
(1st Cir. 1987); Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451, 1464 (N.J. Dist. 1989); Rowell v. 
Holt, 850 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 2003); Holliday v. Jones, 215 Cal. App. 3d 102, 118–119 (1989)). 
150 Dombrowski, 79 A.D.3d at 1590, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (―We thus conclude that a plaintiff 
who establishes that he or she was wrongfully convicted due to the malpractice of his or her 
attorney in a criminal case may recover compensatory damages for the actual injury 
sustained, i.e., loss of liberty, and any consequent emotional injuries or other losses directly 
attributable to his or her imprisonment.‖). 
151 Dombrowski, 19 N.Y.3d at 351–52, 971 N.E.2d at 340, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210. 
152 Id. at 352, 971 N.E.2d at 340, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210. 
153 Id. at 352, 971 N.E.2d at 340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210–11. 
154 Id. at 351, 971 N.E.2d at 340, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210. 
155 Id. (―Although the harm suffered by the claimant is the same—loss of liberty—we reject 
the argument that these types of actions are analogous.‖). 
156 Id. 
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and negligent torts fails because as the court admits, the plaintiff 
must prove by a greater weight of the evidence that he was innocent 
of the crimes he was indicted for in the criminal proceeding.157  
Thus, if a plaintiff can meet this burden of proof and also show that 
the legal malpractice caused a loss of liberty, the damages available 
for the tort of false imprisonment is actionable regardless of 
malice.158  The fact that an actual malice showing is available for a 
malicious prosecution action is not determinative because an 
innocent person falsely imprisoned is equally damaged in respect to 
compensatory damages, regardless of whether the imprisonment 
flows from intentional conduct by the defendant.159 
The crux of the Court of Appeals decision in Dombrowski rests on 
policy issues that are not supported by the record.  The Court 
stated: 
Allowing this type of recovery would have, at best, negative 
and, at worst, devastating consequences for the criminal 
justice system.  Most significantly, such a ruling could have a 
 
157 See Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 566 (Or. 1993) (―We hold that, in order for one 
convicted of a criminal offense to bring an action for professional negligence against that 
person‘s criminal defense counsel, the person must . . . allege ‗harm‘ in that the person has 
been exonerated of the criminal offense through reversal on direct appeal, through post-
conviction relief proceedings, or otherwise.‖); Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & 
Gordon, P.A., 727 A.2d 996, 1000 (N.H. 1999) (―[T]actical or strategic decisions made by 
defense counsel during their representation should not be subject to attack by clients unable 
to prove their actual innocence.‖). 
158 See, e.g., Battalla v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d 
34, 36 (1961) (―It is fundamental to our common-law system that one may seek redress for 
every substantial wrong.‖); Ehrgott v. Mayor of N.Y., 96 N.Y. 264, 281 (1884) (―The best 
statement of the rule is that a wrong-doer is responsible for the natural and proximate 
consequences of his misconduct; and what are such consequences must generally be left for 
the determination of the jury.‖); D. Dusty Rhoades & Laura W. Morgan, Recovery for 
Emotional Distress Damages in Attorney Malpractice Actions, 45 S.C. L. REV. 837, 845 (1993) 
(―When an attorney‘s negligence causes a client‘s loss of liberty, courts have been willing to 
step away from the general rule barring damages for emotional distress.  Generally, these 
cases hold that when an attorney represents a criminal defendant, incarceration is the 
foreseeable result of negligence.  Accordingly, damages for the mental anguish arising from 
that foreseeable result, a non-pecuniary damage, should not be barred.‖). 
159 Velie v. Ellis Law, P.C., 48 A.D.3d 674, 675, 854 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 
2008) (―To establish a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant attorney failed to exercise ‗the ordinary reasonable skill and 
knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal community, and that the attorney‘s 
breach of [that] duty proximately caused plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable 
damages.‘‖ (quoting Rudolf v. Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 N.Y.3d 438, 442, 
867 N.E.2d 385, 387, 835 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536 (2007))); Hoppe v. Ranzini, 385 A.2d 913, 917 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (―[An attorney is liable for] that which his negligence was a 
substantial factor in bringing about.  His negligence need not be the proximate cause of such 
damages.  It suffices if it is a proximate cause thereof.‖). 
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chilling effect on the willingness of the already strapped 
defense bar to represent indigent accused.  Further, it would 
put attorneys in the position of having an incentive not to 
participate in post-conviction efforts to overturn wrongful 
convictions.160 
The court‘s policy concerns are best left to the legislature, which 
is in a better position to decide if court appointed or public defender 
attorneys should be immunized from non-pecuniary damages in 
criminal legal malpractice actions.  Obviously, the court‘s ban on 
non-pecuniary damages will prevent additional financial burdens on 
the public purse in New York, but this concern should be resolved 
by the legislature.  Similarly, the court‘s ban may have a potential 
affect on the cost and availability of malpractice insurance for the 
private bar, but the Dombrowski record is silent on this issue.161 
The court‘s reference to ―devastating consequences for the 
criminal justice system‖ in New York is mistaken and not supported 
by evidence in the record.162  Lacking evidence on this issue, the 
court should not conclude that the inclusion of non-pecuniary 
damages in a criminal legal malpractice cases would affect the 
quality of legal representation for criminal defendants in New 
York.163  The court‘s conclusions are speculative and contrary to the 
idea that one may seek redress for every substantiated wrong. 
The court‘s policy focus should have been on the ―nature of [the] 
plaintiff‘s interest which is harmed,‖164 and not on whether 
inclusion of non-pecuniary damages in criminal legal malpractice 
actions will have a ―chilling effect‖ on defense lawyers.165  Again, the 
 
160 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 352, 971 N.E.2d 338, 340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d 208, 
210–11 (2012). 
161 Id. (focusing only on the effects of attorneys‘ willingness to participate rather than 
broader financial concerns the ruling may have). 
162 Id.; see also Battalla, 10 N.Y.2d at 240, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37 
(―Although fraud, extra litigation and a measure of speculation are, of course, possibilities, it 
is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its jurisdiction.‖); Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & 
Co., 73 A. 688, 692 (Md. 1909) (―The argument from mere expediency cannot commend itself 
to a court of justice resulting in the denial of a logical legal right and remedy in all cases 
because in some a fictitious injury may be urged as a real one.‖). 
163 Dombrowski, 19 N.Y.3d at 352, 971 N.E.2d at 340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210–11 (―[A 
contrary holding] could have a chilling effect on the willingness of the already strapped 
defense bar to represent indigent accused. . . .[and]  put  attorneys in the position of having 
an incentive not to participate in post-conviction efforts to overturn wrongful convictions.‖). 
164 Holliday v. Jones, 264 Cal. Rptr. 448, 458 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1989). 
165 Dombrowski, 19 N.Y.3d at 352, 971 N.E.2d at 340–41, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210–11; see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) (―[A]ctor‘s negligent conduct is a legal cause of 
harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) 
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conclusion is not supported in the record.  To the contrary, one can 
reasonably conclude that criminal defense lawyers will have 
enhanced incentives to vigorously represent their clients if they 
understand non-pecuniary damages can be awarded for their 
negligent representation of criminal defendants. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals did not discuss or analyze recent 
trends in other states in favor of allowing recovery for loss of liberty 
in criminal legal malpractice cases.166  Courts in Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, California, and Florida have stepped away from the 
general rule barring damages for emotional distress in criminal 
legal malpractice cases.167  They recognize that wrongful convictions 
caused by a lawyer‘s criminal negligence can lead to lengthy 
incarceration and loss of liberty, which may constitute the only 
grounds for a meaningful damage recovery in a criminal 
malpractice action. 
For example, in Lawson v. Nugent, the District Court of New 
Jersey held that a plaintiff should be allowed to recover damages for 
emotional distress as a result of counsel‘s failure to mitigate or 
investigate substantial sentencing enhancements.168  As a result of 
counsel‘s woes, the claimant sought damages for ―emotional anguish 
he sustained during the ‗extra‘ twenty months of confinement [he 
served] in a maximum security penitentiary.‖169  Recognizing that 
―mental and emotional distress is just as ‗real‘ as physical pain, and 
that its valuation is no more difficult,‖ the court directed that 
damages for emotional distress should be recoverable.170  The court 
 
there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his 
negligence has resulted in the harm.‖). 
166 See David A. Barry, Legal Malpractice in Massachusetts: Recent Developments, 78 
MASS. L. REV. 74, 82 (1993). 
167 See, e.g., Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242, 1246 (Miss. 1991) (holding that a client 
could maintain a legal malpractice action seeking damages for emotional distress based on 
the allegations that the attorney failed to pursue the client‘s claims for post-conviction relief); 
Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91, 95 (D. N.J. 1988) (concluding that damages are 
recoverable when an attorney‘s negligence in representing the client in a criminal case caused 
the client to serve more time in prison than necessary); Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 
118 (Kan. 1984) (holding that damages for emotional distress may be recovered in criminal 
malpractice cases). 
168 Lawson, 702 F. Supp. at 92 (―Plaintiff alleges that defendant permitted and 
recommended the guilty plea without inquiring whether any factual basis existed for the plea, 
particularly with regard to the use of weapons.‖). 
169 Id.  Four years after sentencing, other legal counsel successfully obtained a reduction of 
the defendant‘s sentence.  Id.  The court vacated the defendant‘s guilty plea as to the two 
aggravated counts of the indictment.  Id. 
170 Id. at 95 (citing Berman v. Allen, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1979)). 
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directed that ―‗medical evidence establishing substantial bodily 
injury or severe and demonstrable psychiatric injury proximately 
caused by the tortfeasor‘s conduct‘‖ could be demonstrated without 
undue burden or frustrating public policy concerns.171 
Similarly, in Singleton v. Stegall,172 the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi held that a legal malpractice action, seeking damages 
for emotional distress, was viable when damages are proven to be 
―separable from that proximately flowing from [the client‘s] 
encounter with the legal process.‖173  The court reasoned that a 
client may show that counsel‘s defaults were the proximate cause of 
substantial emotional distress that may be, at times, differentiated 
from that attendant upon a legal plight.174  The court noted that ―a 
citizen‘s encounter with the legal process is a source of great 
anxiety.  The average litigant experiences substantial emotional 
distress from ‗the rigors of an action, with all of its traumatic 
impact.‘‖175  Nevertheless, the court directed that recovery may be 
appropriate in certain cases where counsel‘s woes have caused the 
tortious infliction of emotional distress irregular to the legal 
process.176 
In Wagenmann v. Adams, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit also concluded that a client could recover damages for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in a malpractice action.177  
While recognizing that non-pecuniary damages are generally 
disallowed in most malpractice cases, the court reasoned that 
situations when the lawyer‘s malpractice results in a loss of liberty 
are inherently different.178  Focusing on the nature of the harm, the 
court reasoned that ―[a]ny attorney . . . should readily . . . 
anticipate[] the agonies attendant upon involuntary (and 
inappropriate) commitment . . . and the subsequent stigma and fear 
 
171 Lawson, 702 F. Supp. at 95 (citing Gautam v. De Luca, 521 A.2d 1343, 1349 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)). 
172  Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242, 1242 (Miss. 1991) (remanding malpractice action 
to determine whether a prisoner could recover damages for emotional distress as a result of  
counsel‘s failure to prepare, file, and present a petition for post-conviction relief, allowing the 
statute of limitations to run). 




177 Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 221–22 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that emotionally-
based injuries were proper in malpractice action when counsels‘ neglect contributed to the 
defendant‘s confinement). 
178 Id. at 222. 
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associated with such a traumatic episode.‖179  Thus, the court 
concluded that when counsel ―caused his client a substantial loss of 
liberty and exposed him to a consequent parade of horrible, . . . 
[there is] no reason artificially to shield . . . his carelessness.‖180  The 
court also observed that to disallow such recovery would not be in 
the interest of justice, concluding that ―[t]he indignities to which the 
plaintiff was subjected through the callous neglect of one appointed 
to champion his cause translate into a substantial monetary 
entitlement.‖181 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Georgia Malone and Dombrowski discussions are primarily 
based on broad and sweeping policy generalizations, which are 
unsubstantiated and not supported by the record.  The Court of 
Appeals‘ policy pronouncements are brief and conclusory.  They are 
not the product of a careful and thoughtful analysis, which the 
bench and bar of New York expect and deserve from the Empire 
State‘s highest court. 
The tort of unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy developed 
by former Chief Judges Benjamin Cardozo, Stanley Fuld, and 
Charles Breitel, who relied on Aristotle and Pomeroy to develop an 
equity and good conscience test to do, ―that which should have been 
done‖182 and ―to soften the impact of legal formalisms.‖183  Their test 
was not intended to be augmented by a mandatory unprecedented 
heightened pleading requirement propounded by the Georgia 
Malone Court of Appeals.  If New York courts determine the century 




181 Id. (―We are not required by the law of the commonwealth, as we read it, to reach such 
an unjust result.‖). 
182 Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 240, 380 N.E.2d 189, 193, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 
(1978).  See Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380, 
(1919) (―[C]onstructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds 
expression.  When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the 
legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a 
trustee.‖); Latham v. Father Divine, 299 N.Y. 22, 27, 85 N.E.2d 168, 170 (1949) (―[I]ts 
applicability is limited only by the inventiveness of men who find new ways to enrich 
themselves unjustly by grasping what should not belong to them.‖). 
183 Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d at 239, 380 N.E.2d at 192, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 362; see BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 39 (Andrew L. Kaufman ed., Quid Pro Law 
Books 2010) (―[W]hen the demon of formalism tempts the intellect with the lure of scientific 
order,‖ a judge needs to be reminded that ―[t]he final cause of law is the welfare of society.‖). 
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not be prohibited from fashioning enforcement relief by hyper-
technical pleading rules created sua sponte by the Georgia Malone 
Court of Appeals. 
The tort of criminal legal malpractice provides a remedy of 
damages for a defense counsel‘s negligence which results in a 
wrongful conviction and wrongful incarceration.184  The remedy is a 
meaningless one without a measure of recovery, which the 
Dombrowski Court of Appeals denies as a matter of law.185  The loss 
of liberty and emotional distress damages are extremely difficult to 
prove, but a deserving plaintiff should be given the opportunity to 
do so.  The criminal defense bar of New York, most of whom are 
court appointed or public defenders, will not lose interest or 
incentives in representing defendants because non-pecuniary 
damages may be awarded against them in criminal legal 
malpractice actions.  The arduous requirement that a plaintiff 
proves ―a colorable claim of actual innocence‖186 and ―that [his] 
conviction would not have resulted absent [his] attorney‘s negligent 
representation‖187 will screen out most claims before the issue of 
non-pecuniary damages arise.  Finally, the legislature, and not the 
Court of Appeals, should decide whether criminal defense attorneys 
should be immunized from non-pecuniary damage awards. 
 
184 Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347, 350, 971 N.E.2d 338, 339, 948 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 
(2012). 
185 Id. at 350, 352, 971 N.E.2d at 339, 341, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 209, 211. 
186 Id. at 351, 971 N.E.2d at 340, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 210. 
187 Id. 
